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Signaling the Fed's Intentions
Since the beginning ofthis year, the M1 monetary
aggregate, which consists ofcurrency and all
checkable deposits, has been growing above its
"cone," a shape often used to represent the Fed's
target range for the aggregate (see Chart). The
upper and lower boundaries ofthe cone show the
path ofM1ifitweretogrowpreciselyat the upper
and lower limits, respectively, ofthe Fed's annual
target ranges. Thus, in theChart, the upperedgeof
the cone shows the path ofM1 if itwere to grow
throughout the year at the 7 percent upper limitof
the Fed's 4 to 7 percenttarget range forM1 growth
in 1985. Actual M1 growth from the fourth quarter
of 1984 (the base for the 1985 targets) to the fi rst
quarterof 1985 was 10.5 percent, putting M1
above the cone (also shown in the Chart).
During the first quarterofthe year, the financial
press speculated that the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), the monetary policy making
arm ofthe Fed, would be forced to tighten mone-
tary policy because M1 was growing above the
cone. However, Chairman Volcker in his February
testimony to Congress on the targets for 1985 said
that "Interpreted rigidly (and wrongly), the nar-
rowness ofa cone in the early part ofthe year. ..
would attach policy importanceto levels ormove-
ments in the various aggregates that in fact have no
significance." He went on to say that"...a better
'pictorial' approach would be to illustrate the tar-
gets by ...parallel lines..." This alternative rep-
resentation ofthe target for M1 as a band is also
shown in the Chart.
This Letter discusses why the way in which the
FOMC'stargets are presented is important. It begins
by looking at how the FOMC began to set annual
targets and to formulate them as ranges.
Why long-run target ranges?
The FOMC began expressingexplicit annual tar-
gets for growth in the monetary aggregates in
response to House Concurrent Resolution 133
(passed in March 1975), which represented Con-
gress' desire to make monetary policydecisions
more explicit and identifiable. Several different
issues had to be resolved in specifying the appro-
priate targets. One was whether to express the
targets as a single value or as a range.
Several factors suggest that itwould be desirable
to formulate thetarget as arange. The first is oneof
technical control: It is extremely doubtful thatthe
FOMC can control money precisely enough to be
ableto hitone specific value. Another, more fun-
damental, reason is that the growth rate ofthe
monetary aggregates is subjectto substantial tran-
sitory changes in the short-run-changes that will
notpersist. This impliesthattheFOMCshould not
always act to offset a change in the growth rate of
money, something that it may be forced to do if it
were targeting a single number.
Finally, the Fed is required bythe Federal Reserve
Act"topromoteeffectivelythe goalsofmaximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates." Clearly, ifthe Fed were re-
quired to influence prevailingeconomic condi-
tions when those conditions are deemed undesir-
able, it must have the leeway to vary the growth
rate ofmoney. For instance, money may be grow-
ing at its prespecified target rate at the same time
that the level ofunemployment is higherthan
acceptable. In such acase, the FOMCwould need
some latitude for adjusting money growth, and a
range oftarget growth rates gives itthat latitude.
The FOMC does have the alternative ofchanging
its targets. However, frequent changes in targets
endanger the FOMC's credibility in the sense that
the market might come to believe that the FOMC
is notcommitted to its targets. Consequently,
having anarrow range oftargetgrowth rates seems
a preferable way ofgivingthe FOMC flexibility
to respond to new situations and unforeseen
circumstances.
For these reasons, the monetary targets are ex-
pressed as ranges. It is importantto note thatthe
ranges specify maximum and minimum growth
rates for the monetary aggregates from the fourth
quarterofthe base yeartothefourth quarterofthe
current year. Nothing in the way that these ranges
are formulated impliesthatmonetarygrowth must
always stay within this range during a year. How-
ever, in early 1985 (and, on occasion, before that
as well), a large numberoffinancial market parti-
cipants behaved as though this were exactly what
was implied. To an importantextent, their behaviorFRBSF
was a reaction to the use ofcones in depicting the
target ranges. As aresult, asituation was created in
which marketexpectations-about how the
FaMC would reactto "deviations" ofthe mone-
tary aggregate from target-were inconsistent
with the FaMC's intentions.
The market'sviewpoint
Since the growth ofthe money supply has an
important bearing on economic magnitudes such
as the rate ofinterest, financial marketparticipants
must attemptto foretast this growth. In making
their assessment, participants must determine,
among otherthings, whetherthe FaMC is com-
mitted to attaining its targets.
On thebasis ofits recent record, there seems to be
ample evidence that the FOMC is committed to
attaining its monetarytargets. In the lastfouryears,
target ranges werespecified 5timeso (A newtarget
was specified in the middleof1983 to allow for a
sharp decline in velocity.) Amongthese targetper-
iods, M1 was above its target range only in 1982
andthe first halfof1983. Since thatnarrowperiod
also was one in whichthevelocityofM1 declined
sharply, a case can be made thatthe FaMC was
justified in letting M1 exceed its target.
Given their belief in the FaMC's commitmentto
attaining its targets, market participants will ob-
viously also try to determine whether conditions
existto force the FaMC to act. Whatthey have to
determine at any pointduringthe year is whether
the underlying, systematic trend in money growth
is high enough that moneygrowth forthe whole
year will exceed its target range. The data on
which these decisions are made are simply the
weekly and monthly M1 statistics. As mentioned
above, the statistics may be subjectto large short-
run, temporaryfluctuations. Someeconomists, for
example, havecalculatedthatthistransitory com-
ponentmaybe greaterthan $3 billion in any given
week. The market's problem is that itmust tryto
separate the underlyingtrend in money growth
from its temporary, nonsystematic components.
It is here that the way in which the targets are
presented becomes important. It appears that
market participants use a rule ofthumb in their
decision making: they focus upon where the ob-
served value of money is in relation to the bound-
aries ofthe target cone. Should observed money
begrowingabovethe cone, theyconcludethatthe
underlying rate has changed. Their beliefthat the
FOMC is committed to fighting inflation then leads
them to expect thatthe FaMC will act to slow
down the rate ofmoney growth.
This is the reason that money growth above the
cone acquires "policy importance." In principle,
given their beliefthat the FaMC is committed to
fighting inflation, market participants are likely to
react in the same way no matterwhat sort of
device is used to illustrate the target ranges. How-
ever, there are special reasons using acone makes
it more likely that market participants will expect
the FOMC to act in the early part ofany year.
The problem with using cones
There are both technical and non-technical rea-
sons that money is quite likely to grow outside the
cone in the beginningoftheyear. First, the base for
the cone is the average value ofthe monetary
aggregate for the fourth quarterofthe previous
year, which is centered in November (see Chart).
If, between mid-November and the end ofthe
year, money grows faster than the maximum rate
ofthe target range for the succeeding year, itwill
already be above the cone when the new year
begins. This is whathappened, forexample, at the
end of1984, when the FOMC letthemoneysupply
expand vigorously in the fourth quarter to offset
slow money growth in the third quarter and to
revive the lagging economy (see Chart). In this
way, developments in the previous year can deter-
minewherethe moneystock is relativeto its target
in the new year.
Second, the cone's narrowness in the early partof
theyearcreates an additional technical problem.
In any particular week, there is a reasonably high
probabiIitythattransitoryeventswiII dominate the
underlyingtrend. For instance, variations in tax
refunds by the Treasury can cause relatively large
swings in money during any given week. These
relatively large random movements can push the
monetary aggregate outside the narrow part ofthe
cone. For example, at the end ofFebruary 1985,
the width ofthe cone for M1 was approximately
$4.8 billion. A random shock of $3 million during
aweek in February could easily have pushed the
level ofM1 outside the cone.
Finally, there are policy reasons that make it pos-
sible for money to grow outside the cone in the
beginning ofthe year. Shou ld the FaMC decide
that economic conditions make it necessary to
alter the growth rate ofmoney in the short-run,Alternative Ways of Depicting











pretation ofthetarget range forM1 growth in terms
ofthe levels ofM1 throughout the year. This inter-
pretation expresses the target range as a pairof
parallel lines projected backfrom the fourth quarter
averageofM1 in thetargetyear. Adherencetothis
"band" would produce an average growth in M1
overthe year within the FOMe's target range. In
comparison to a cone, therefore, it reduces the
chance that the random component in money
growth wiII cause moneytopiercethetarget range
in the early part ofthe year. It also solves the
problem of uneven discretionary scope for the




This year, in his February testimony to Congress,
Chairman Volcker presented an alternative inter-
even relatively small increases in the moneysupply
to accomplish this are likely to place the level of
money outside the cone in the first few months of
the year. This implies that the FOMC has less
discretion to vary the level of money in the eco-
nomy in the beginningoftheyearthan itdoes later
on ifitwishes to keep money growth inside the
cone. Such a restriction is undesirable since it
arisesonIy because ofthe shape ofthe cone.
Summing up
The change in the method of presenting targets
appears to have been motivated by the FOMe's
concerns aboutmarketexpectationsthatthe Com-
mitteewouId have totighten monetarypolicy. The
increase in the width ofthe range in the early part
ofthe year was probably an attempt to convey to
the marketthe idea that the FOMC did not reggrd
money growth outside the cone as particularly
alarming at thattime. This interpretation is rein-
forced by the published policy record ofthe Feb-
ruary 12 FOMC meeting, which shows that the
Committee voted to leave policy unchanged.
In a broader context, it is quite apparent that the
market's fascination with the target ranges is due
to the increased credibiIity ofthe FOMe's anti-in-
flation stance. Because the market believes that
the FOMC is committed to fighting inflation, it
tends to regard all departures from thetarget ranges
as phenomena which the monetaryauthority must
eventually actto correct. The Fed, in turn, has
been trying to communicate to the markets that
other factors may make itentirely appropriate for
the money stock to lie temporarily outside the.
depicted ranges.
Viewed in this way, the adoption ofbands to illus-
trate monetary policy probably has a short-lived
usefulness. It reduces thechances that moneywill
be seen growing outside its target range, but it
does not solve the general problem ofhow to
convey to financial markets that all departures
from the depicted target, no matter how expressed,
do not require "corrective" action by the FOMe.
In the event some departure from the band were
ever appropriate, the FOMC would again face the
problem ofcommunicating to the markets that it
would be inappropriate to return M1 to within the
band. Bharat Trehan
1985 1984
Any ofthe factors discussed above can cause
money to lie outside the cone in the beginning of
the year. Oncethis happens, market participants
may expectthe FOMC to take action to bring
money back within the cone because these parti-
cipants act as ifadherence to the FOMe's annual
target ranges for money implies that money must
stay within thecone. This causes a problem forthe
conductof monetary policy because it sets up a
conflictbetween marketexpectations about likely
policy actions and what the FOMC may itself per-
ceive to be the most desirable course of action.
The FOMe's dilemma then is whether to conduct
policy according to its own perception ofunder-
lying conditions while ignoringthe possible re-
surgence ofinflationaryexpectations, ortoconduct
policy with a view to keeping inflationary expec-
tations in check and consequently acting contrary
to its best judgment. The problem with using cones
to illustratetarget ranges is thatthey make it much
more likely that the FOMC will face such a dil-
emma early in the year.
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Francisco, orofthe Board ofGovernorsofthe Federal Reserve System.
Editorial commentsmay beaddressedtotheeditor(GregoryTong) ortotheauthor...•Freecopiesof Federal Reserve publications
can beobtainedfrom the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco





BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
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Loans, Leases and Investmentsl 2 191,677 278 11,676 6.4
Loans and Leases1 6 173,631 610 12,697 7.8
Commercial and Industrial 52,058 95 2,677 5.4
Real estate 63,216 48 2,832 4.6
Loans to Individuals 34,301 85 6,205 22.0
Leases 5,379 1 376 7.5
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,078 - 363 - 870 - 7.2
Other Securities2 6,968 31 - 151 - 2.1
Total Deposits 197,415 -1,262 8,709 4.6
Demand Deposits 46,961 -1,273 1,941 4.3
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 31,306 230 1,019 3.3
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,827 - 273 1,388 11.1
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,626 284 5,378 4.0
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,210 215 5,147 13.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,315 25 - 1,150 - 2.9
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 21,672 -1,672 3,805 21.2
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, IT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change